

# Compensation system of the Executive Board



- non-binding convenience translation -

## AGENDA ITAM 14 - RESOLUTION ON THE APPROVAL OF THE COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR MEMBERS OF THE MANAGE-MENT BOARD

Pursuant to Sect. 120a (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (*AktG*) in the version applicable since January 1, 2020 in accordance with the Act Implementing the Second Shareholder Rights Directive (*ARUG II*) of December 12, 2019, the Annual General Meeting of a listed company shall resolve on the approval of the compensation system for members of the Management Board whenever there is a significant change to the system, but at least every four years.

On June 10, 2021, the Annual General Meeting of Medios AG resolved under agenda item 8 on the compensation system of the Management Board for the first time. The Annual General Meeting of 2021 adopted this compensation system with a majority of 90.97% of the represented share capital. The current compensation system for the Management Board includes a variable compensation, consisting of three performance-related components: the ESG bonus and the Short-Term-Incentive, both with a term of one financial year and the Long-Term-Incentive program (stock option plan) with a term of four years.

Regarding the Short-Term-Incentive, an editorial mistake concerning the performance target and the method of calculation is to be corrected. The performance target of "inorganic growth" is mistakenly referencing the purchase price-EBT ratio. However, the group-wide key figure is EBITDA, which is why this correction is to be made.

Furthermore, the performance target and the exercise price for the Long-Term-Incentive are to be determined with more flexibility in the future, so that current developments may be accounted for.

Apart from that, the compensation system for the Management Board remains unchanged.

The Supervisory Board proposes that the following resolution be adopted:

The compensation system for the members of the Management Board set out in the Annex to this agenda item 14 is approved.

## ANNEX TO AGENDA ITEM 14 - DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR MEMBERS OF THE MANAGEMENT BOARD

## I. Basic principles of the compensation system for members of the Management Board

The strategy of Medios AG and the Medios Group is to further strengthen its significant position in the specialty pharma sector and to exploit growth opportunities. In this context, organic and inorganic growth are equally important elements of the strategy. Active and at the same time well-ordered capital allocation is a high priority for the Medios Group in order to create sustainable value for all stakeholders. The Supervisory Board and the Management Board act in the knowledge that good corporate governance, opportunity management and risk management are key elements of corporate management and thus, the basis for the success of the Company.

The corporate strategy of the Medios Group is also aimed at operating profitably in the specialty pharma segment and gaining further market share without generating excessive additional financing requirements (working capital). In this context, responsible corporate governance and the simultaneous use of business opportunities are of high importance. In the structuring of the compensation system, the determination of the individual compensation, the selection of the relevant performance indicators and the structuring of the payment and allocation modalities, essentially, the following principles have been pursued or considered:



- Promoting the long-term and sustainable corporate development of the Medios Group and supporting the corporate strategy
- Conformity with the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act ("AktG") and the German Corporate Governance Code ("GCGC")
- Consideration of shareholder interests and the needs of relevant stakeholders
- Addition of Environmental, Social & Governance (ESG) criteria to promote sustainable development of the Medios Group
- Transparent communication of the Management Board's compensation both internally and externally
- Synchronization and consistency of internal corporate objectives in order to align incentives for the Management Board and the senior management
- Consideration of modern as well as common market elements and mechanisms

## II. Procedure for determining, reviewing and implementing the compensation system

The Supervisory Board as a whole is responsible for the structure of the compensation system for the Management Board members and for determining the individual compensation. The Supervisory Board, in accordance with Sec. 87 para. (1) and Sec. 87a para. (1) AktG, resolved the compensation system described herein. In all compensation decisions, the Supervisory Board takes into account the requirements of the Stock Corporation Act and the recommendations of the GCGC.

In the event of significant changes to the compensation system, but at least every four years, the compensation system is presented to the General Meeting for approval. In general, the compensation system is implemented within the framework of the Management Board service contract. If the General Meeting does not approve the submitted compensation system for the Management Board, the Supervisory Board will review the compensation system in detail, taking into account the system's marketability and competitiveness as well as the regulatory framework and investors' requirements, and will present a reviewed compensation system at the subsequent annual general meeting accordingly.

In this context, the changes to the compensation system are described in detail and, at the same time, the extent to which the shareholders' comments have been taken into account is addressed.

All decisions of the Supervisory Board (and any committees) on the compensation system are subject to the rules generally applicable to the handling of conflicts of interest. Accordingly, the members of the Supervisory Board are obliged to disclose conflicts of interest in particular without delay to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board shall provide information on conflicts of interest that have arisen during the financial year and how they have been dealt with in its report to the general meeting. In the meeting in which decisions are made on matters in which the personal interests or the interests of related persons or companies of a member of the Supervisory Board may be affected, the Supervisory Board member concerned must abstain from voting on decisions, unless in individual cases even participation in the discussion and adoption of resolutions is or should be omitted. If the conflicts of interest are material and not merely temporary, this will lead to the termination of the Supervisory Board mandate.

The Supervisory Board regularly reviews the appropriateness and customary nature of the compensation of the members of the Management Board and, if necessary, draws up adjustments to ensure a compensation package for the members of the Management Board that is both in line with the market and competitive within the regulatory framework. Criteria for the appropriateness of the compensation are the tasks of the individual member of the Management Board, the personal performance, the economic situation and future prospects of the Medios AG as well as the customary level and structure of the Management Board compensation at comparable companies. In addition, the tasks and performance of the respective Management Board member and the salary structure within the Company are taken into account.



The Supervisory Board pays particular attention to ensuring that the compensation of the members of the Management Board and the compensation system are appropriate and in line with market practice. The assessment of the market conformity of the compensation is made both in comparison with other companies (horizontal comparison) and within Medios AG based on the ratio of the compensation of the Management Board to the compensation of senior management and the workforce as a whole (vertical comparison). Selected MDAX and SDAX companies are taken into account for the horizontal comparison. To assess the appropriateness of the compensation of the Management Board within the Medios Group, the senior management level below the Management Board within the Medios Group is taken into account, and for the workforce as a whole, the assessment is based on the average compensation of the employees within the Medios Group. In doing so, both the current ratio and the change in the ratio over time are taken into account.

If necessary, the Supervisory Board may consult with external advisors. If the Supervisory Board consults an external compensation expert for the development of the compensation system and for the assessment of the appropriateness of the compensation, it shall ensure that the expert is independent of the Management Board and the Company and shall take precautions to avoid conflicts of interest.

In accordance with the compensation system presented, the Supervisory Board determines the total "total target compensation" and determines, for the upcoming financial year, the performance criteria for the variable compensation components for the Management Board members provided for in the compensation system. For each member of the Management Board, the total target compensation is the sum of fixed and variable compensation.

In particularly exceptional cases (such as a severe economic crisis), the Supervisory Board may temporarily deviate from the components of the Management Board compensation system (procedures and regulations on the structure and amount of the compensation as well as the individual compensation components) if this is necessary in the interest of the long-term well-being of the Company. A deviation from the compensation system is only possible through a corresponding resolution of the Supervisory Board and after careful examination of its necessity. The components of the compensation system from which deviation is possible in the above circumstances are the procedure, the compensation structure, the individual compensation components and their performance criteria. Furthermore, in this case the Supervisory Board can temporarily grant additional compensation components or replace individual compensation components with other compensation components, insofar as this is necessary to restore the appropriateness of the Management Board compensation in the specific situation.

## III. Overview of the compensation components and the compensation structure

The Supervisory Board will apply the compensation system described herein in accordance with the legal requirements to all service agreements with members of the Management Board of Medios AG that are newly concluded, changed or extended two months after the initial approval of the compensation system by the General Meeting (Sec. 87a para. (2) sentence 1 AktG, Sec. 26j para. (1) sentence 2 Introductory Act to the Stock Corporation Act, ("EGAktG")).

#### 1. Compensation components

The compensation system for the Management Board of Medios AG comprises the compensation components shown below.

The compensation of the members of the Management Board consists of a non-performance-related (fixed) component and a performance-related (variable) component. A Company pension plan (pension commitments) is expressly not provided.

The fixed compensation components comprise the non-performance-related basic compensation and fringe benefits. The variable compensation consists on the one hand of an annual short-term variable compensation component ("Short-Term-Incentive" or "STI"), a bonus payment for the achievement of



certain ESG criteria ("**ESG-Bonus**"), and a long-term variable compensation ("**Long-Term-Incentive**" or "**LTI**").

#### 2. Compensation structure

The fixed compensation components account for 28% - 35% of the total target compensation of a Management Board member, the variable compensation components account for 65% - 72% of the total target compensation (of which approx. 2% - 3% is attributable to the ESG-bonus, 28% to 35% to the STI and 29% to 42% to the LTI).

#### IV. Description of the compensation components

#### 1. Differentiation according to the individual requirement profile

In view of the principle of overall responsibility of the Management Board, the Supervisory Board has decided against function-specific differentiations with regard to compensation for individual members of the Management Board. An exception is the higher compensation of the CEO of the Management Board, which should adequately reflect his greater scope of duties and representation and the associated additional workload. For first-time appointments, the Supervisory Board reserves the right to agree lower total target compensations with lower compensation components.

#### 2. Maximum compensation

In accordance with Sec. 87a para. (1) sentence 2 no. 1 AktG, the Supervisory Board has set a maximum compensation which limits the total amount of compensation actually received for a given financial year. In this context, amounts from all fixed and variable compensation components are taken into account as part of the total amount received.

The maximum compensation for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) amounts to EUR 2.5m and for ordinary members of the Management Board amounts to EUR 2m.

If the sum of the payments from a financial year exceeds this maximum compensation, the last compensation component to be paid out will be reduced accordingly.

#### 3. Fixed base compensation

The annual base compensation is contractually agreed upon with the respective Management Board member and is paid in twelve equal monthly installments. The member of the Management Board does not receive any additional compensation for mandates or other activities in other companies affiliated with the Company within the meaning of Sec. 15 et seq. AktG.

#### 4. Fringe benefits

In addition to the reimbursement of travel expenses and other business-related expenses, each Management Board member shall receive monthly allowances for health and nursing care insurance within the framework of the statutory provisions. The Company can provide each member of the Management Board with an appropriate company car and a mobile phone for private use. In addition, the Company grants every member of the Management Board accident insurance (for death and disability).

All members of the Management Board are insured against the risk of being made liable for financial losses in the course of their work through a D&O insurance taken out at the expense of Medios AG, that includes a deductible in the amount in accordance with the provisions of the Stock Corporation Act.

#### 5. Variable performance-based compensation components

The variable compensation of the Management Board members is intended to provide the right incentives for the Management Board to act in line with the corporate strategy and the stakeholders and to achieve long-term goals on a sustainable basis. The three performance-related variable compensation



components are the ESG-bonus and the STI, each with a term of one (financial) year and the LTI with a term of four years.

If the sum of payments from a financial year exceeds the maximum compensation, the last compensation component to be paid out - usually a variable performance-based compensation component - is reduced accordingly.

#### a. Short-Term-Incentive

Under the Short-Term-Incentive, a bonus is payable to members of the Management Board if certain ambitious targets set by the Supervisory Board are achieved.

#### aa. Targets and calculation

Each Management Board member may receive an amount of up to 100% of the respective agreed fixed compensation as STI depending on the achievement of the defined targets. The specific targets and the calculation of their share of the STI are structured as follows:

- Inorganic growth: up to 40% of the STI can be achieved in connection with the successful execution of M&A transactions, provided that these meet certain requirements with regard to the purchase price-EBITDA ratio and the profitability of the target company;
- Revenue growth: a further 20% of the STI can be earned via a growing Group revenue by an ambitious percentage compared to the previous year set by the Supervisory Board;
- EBITDA growth: a further 20% of the STI can be achieved by growing Group EBITDA (before special effects) compared to the previous year by an ambitious percentage set by the Supervisory Board;
- EBITDA margin: a further 20% of the STI can be achieved by increasing the Group EBITDA margin (before special effects) to an ambitious margin set by the Supervisory Board.

The proportion of short-term variable compensation under the STI in the total target compensation is 28% to 35%. The amount of the annual payments under the STI for the respective Management Board member is limited to 100% of the non-performance-related basic compensation (excluding fringe benefits).

#### bb. Key figures and other provisions

The consolidated financial statements prepared and audited in accordance with IFRS are binding on the Medios Group for the purposes of revenue growth, consolidated EBITDA growth and the consolidated EBITDA margin.

Payments under the STI are due pro rata temporis in the event of a contract of a Management Board member beginning or ending during the year. The respective payment amount under the STI is due for payment by the last day of the month following the adoption of the annual financial statements for the past financial year.

#### b. Long-Term Incentive Program (Stock option plan)

The variable long-term compensation for members of the Management Board consists of a stock option plan (Long-Term Incentive Program, "LTIP" or "Stock Option Plan"). The share of the long-term variable compensation under the LTIP amounts to a range from 29% to 42% of the total target compensation.

Medios AG pursues a compensation policy aligned to the interests of shareholders in line with the "shareholder value principle". The objective is to increase the value of the shareholders' participation in the long term, expressed by increasing the value of the Company's shares. Both managers and employees are to be incentivized towards this goal. The fact that a significant portion of the total target compensation consists of long-term variable compensation in the form of stock options, ensures that the corporate strategy is strongly geared towards sustainable business growth, including the creation of value for shareholders and all stakeholders.



#### aa. Granting

Under the Stock Option Plan, members of the Management Board are entitled to options on shares of Medios AG. By contractual agreement with each member of the Management Board ("Subscription Rights Agreement"), the Management Board member shall receive the right to acquire an individually agreed number of no-par value bearer shares of Medios AG ("Shares") at an exercise price which is to be determined by the Supervisory Board at its due discretion ("Exercise Price") after expiry of the respective waiting period and upon fulfillment of the performance target in accordance with the provisions of the Subscription Rights Agreement ("Stock Options"). The performance target provides for a significant increase in the share price of the Medios-stock above its price at the time the options were granted.

The Stock Options may be issued annually by the Supervisory Board in single or multiple tranches.

#### bb. Exercisability and performance target

The four-year waiting period ("**Vesting Period**") begins on the day the Stock Options are granted. The respective Management Board member can only exercise the Stock Options after expiry of the Vesting Period. The Stock Options may only be exercised in respect of a contractually agreed minimum number in each case.

The exercise of the Stock Options can take place within an exercise period of seven years, which begins at the end of the Vesting Period ("**Exercise Period**"). If the beneficiary does not exercise the option rights by the end of the Exercise Period, the option rights expire without replacement.

The prerequisite for exercising the Stock Options is that the performance target has been achieved within a period of thirty stock exchange trading days before the waiting period expires. The performance target is achieved if the closing price of the Company's shares in XETRA trading (or a comparable successor system of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange) reaches or exceeds an amount which is to be determined by the Supervisory Board at its due discretion for thirty consecutive stock market trading days ("**Performance Target**").

#### cc. Miscellaneous

Further vesting periods or shareholding periods (such as share ownership guidelines) are not required at Medios AG.

In the event of termination of the employment relationship by the Company or the Management Board member or in the event of other termination of the mandate or employment relationship for whatever reason ("**Termination**"), the portion of the Stock Options for which the respective vesting period has not yet expired by the time of Termination shall generally be forfeited. The Stock Option Plan provides for one quarter of the total number of Stock Options granted to vest at the end of December 31 of each year.

#### c. ESG bonus

Sustainable action shall form an integral part of the strategy of Medios AG and the Medios-Group. The ESG bonus focuses on the contribution of Medios AG to creating stable economic, social and environmental conditions for current and future generations. Performance criteria for measuring the ESG bonus are therefore exclusively sustainability targets, primarily from the areas of

- · climate, energy & environment,
- · employees, social & governance and
- technology & innovation.

As a company with a leading position in the specialty pharma sector, the Medios Group would like to implement an equally innovative sustainability strategy with its innovative services and products. A compensation component in the form of an ESG bonus based exclusively on non-financial sustainability goals promotes that Medios AG fulfills its responsibility as part of society.

The short-term variable compensation under the ESG bonus makes up 2% to 3% of the total target compensation of the respective Management Board member. The ESG bonus is as a target bonus with a one-



year assessment period corresponding to the Company's financial year and is calculated based on the overall target achievement of selected ESG targets determined by the Supervisory Board.

#### aa. Objective and achievement

Before the start of each financial year, the Supervisory Board, in consultation with the Management Board, determines two to four ESG targets uniformly for all Management Board members. For each of the defined ESG targets, the Supervisory Board sets a target value, a challenging threshold value, and an appropriate maximum value.

When setting ESG targets, the Supervisory Board takes into account non-financial targets from the areas of climate & environment, employees, social & governance, and technology & innovation. These include, for example, contributions to global climate protection (CO2 reduction or CO2 neutrality), recycling, renewable energies, the promotion of diversity and employee satisfaction as well as occupational health.

In setting the ESG targets, the Supervisory Board also determines the weighting among the set ESG targets for overall target achievement and criteria and methods for assessing the achievement of the respective ESG targets. At the same time, a specific target amount in EUR is set for each Management Board member for achieving an overall target level of 100% for the defined ESG targets ("**Target Amount**").

#### bb. Determination of target achievement

At the end of the financial year, the Supervisory Board determines the degree of target achievement for each of the defined ESG targets as a percentage for each member of the Management Board. Values between the threshold, the target and the maximum value are interpolated linearly, and the Supervisory Board then uses the degree of target achievement for each of the ESG targets to determine the overall degree of target achievement as an average. A target achievement with a specified ESG target below the threshold of 80% is included in the calculation with the factor zero. The payout amount is then determined by multiplying the Target Amount by the overall degree of target achievement.

The payout amount of the ESG bonus capped at 100% of the Target Amount. There is no guaranteed minimum target achievement, so the payout may not be made at all.

The ESG bonus is due for payment in cash four months after the end of the relevant financial year. If the service contract or the mandate on the Management Board only existed on a pro rata temporis during a financial year, the overall degree of target achievement is calculated proportionally and the ESG bonus is only paid pro rata temporis.

The compensation report for the past financial year provides transparent information about the specifically defined ESG goals, the degree of goal achievement for each of the ESG goals, the overall degree of goal achievement and the target amounts for a financial year.

#### 6. Malus and Clawback provisions

Malus and Clawback provisions will also be implemented in the Management Board service contracts. Such provisions allow variable compensation components already paid out to be reclaimed or not yet paid out to be reduced under certain conditions. This Clawback option covers all variable components of the Management Board compensation, i.e. compensation under the ESG bonus, the Long-Term Incentive-Program and the Short-Term-Incentive.

In the event of a serious and intentional breach of duty or compliance by a member of the Management Board, the Company may cancel or withhold part or all of the variable compensation under the ESG bonus, the Short-Term-Incentive and the Long-Term Incentive-Program ("Malus") and forfeit or demand the return of variable compensation components already granted without compensation ("Clawback") if these are variable compensation components agreed upon after the expiry of two months following initial approval of the compensation system by the Annual General Meeting.

Relevant breaches of duty and compliance include, among other things, breaches of due diligence in the management of the Company pursuant to Sec. 93 AktG, violations of internal company guidelines, criminal offenses and other serious unethical behavior.



The Company's Supervisory Board decides on a Malus or Clawback in each individual case at its dutiful discretion and gives the affected Management Board member the opportunity to comment on the respective breach of behavior in advance.

In the event of a Clawback (i.e. a reclaim), the Management Board member must reimburse 50% of the amount received ("Net Amount"), limited to a period of up to four years prior to the Clawback.

The possibility of a Malus and Clawback also exists if the board mandate or the employment relationship with the Management Board member has already ended at the time of the decision.

If variable compensation components linked to the achievement of specific targets were wrongly paid out on the basis of incorrect data, the Company is entitled, irrespective of any misconduct on the part of the Management Board member, to demand repayment of the difference resulting from the recalculation of the amount of variable compensation on the basis of correct data compared with the amount paid out ("Strict Clawback"). The Company must demonstrate that the data on which the compensation calculation has been based, was incorrect and that the variable compensation was therefore too high. In this case, the rules on Malus and Clawback described above shall apply accordingly.

Claims for damages and other statutory claims against the Management Board member shall remain unaffected by the Malus and Clawback provision.

#### 7. Compensation-related transactions

### a. Term of the service agreements for members of the Management Board

The Supervisory Board observes the statutory requirements and essentially the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code when appointing members of the Management Board and determining the term of their contracts. Management Board service agreements are concluded for the duration of the respective appointment. In the case of a first-time appointment as a member of the Management Board, the term of appointment is generally three years, a deviation can be permissible in justified exceptional cases (for example, in the case of the promotion of an employee at the management level of Medios AG to a member of the Management Board). In the event of a reappointment, the maximum term is five years.

If the Management Board member is permanently incapacitated for work during the term of the service agreement, the contract shall end at the latest, without notice of termination being required, at the end of the quarter in which the permanent incapacity for work has been established.

In the event of revocation of the appointment, resignation from office by the Management Board member or other termination of the Management Board mandate, the Management Board service agreement shall end upon expiry of the relevant period under Sec. 622 of the German Civil Code (BGB). In this case, Medios AG shall be entitled to release the Management Board member from any further activity for the Company for the remaining term of the service contract. The release shall be subject to continued payment of the contractually agreed compensation.

This shall not affect the right of both parties to terminate the Management Board service contract without notice for good cause.

#### b. Benefits upon termination of contract

In the event of the death of an Management Board member before the end of the term of the service contract, the respective spouse or dependent children of the deceased Management Board member are entitled to the granting of the non-performance-related fixed base compensation (i.e. gross monthly salary according to the respective Management Board service contract) for the month of death and the following three months.

The existing Executive Board service agreements contain severance payment provisions in line with the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code. If the employment relationship with a



member of the Management Board ends due to resignation from office or due to a mutual termination agreement, the members of the Management Board are entitled to a severance payment.

However, this does not apply in the event that the Company terminates the service contract for an important reason for which the Management Board member is responsible in accordance with Sec. 626 BGB. The severance payment may not exceed the amount of two total annual compensation and may not exceed the compensation for the remainder of the contractual term.

#### c. Change of control

When new contracts are concluded with members of the Management Board (initial appointment) or their extension, the following special provisions can be agreed upon in the event of a change of control, but no additional severance payment.

In the event of a change of control, the Management Board member has the right to resign from office with three months' notice. The service contract also ends at that point in time. There is a change of control if

the Company's shares are withdrawn from trading on a regulated market (delisting);

the appointment of the Management Board member ends due to a change of the legal form of the Company or due to a merger of the Company into another company, unless the Management Board member is offered an appointment as a member of the Management Board in the new company under economically identical conditions as before;

an inter-company agreement has been concluded with Medios AG as a dependent company pursuant to Sec. 291 et seq. AktG or the company is incorporated pursuant to Sec. 319 et seq. AktG.

The current Management Board contracts do not provide for any of the special arrangements described above.

#### d. Entry and exit during the year

In the event of joining or leaving the Company during the year, the total compensation is granted *pro rata temporis* basis in accordance with the length of the employment relationship in the relevant financial year.

#### e. Post-contractual non-competition clause

No post-contractual non-competition clauses are included in the current management service contracts.

The Supervisory Board may stipulate a post-contractual non-competition clause for up to two years for new or renewed Management Board service agreements. For the duration of the non-competition clause, the respective Management Board member shall be paid compensation amounting to 50% of the compensation last received under the contract. Any other income received during the non-competition period will be offset against the compensation to the extent that, taking into account the other income, the compensation would exceed the most recent contractual compensation. In addition, other contractual severance payments to a member of the Management Board shall be offset against the compensation for non-competition.

The Supervisory Board has the option of agreeing such a clause - also in individual cases - in the future. If a post-contractual non-compete clause is agreed as part of the termination, it is contractually agreed that a possible severance payment will be offset against the compensation under the Management Board service agreement.

#### f. Compensation for board activities within the Medios Group

The members of the Management Board of Medios AG do not receive any additional or separate compensation, fixed or variable, for holding offices or other activities in other companies affiliated with the Medios AG within the meaning of Sec.15 et seq. AktG. Any compensation nevertheless received will be offset against the contractually agreed compensation under the Management Board service agreement.



## V. Consideration of employee compensation and employment conditions when determining the compensation system (Sec. 87a para. (1) sentence 2 No. 9 AktG)

The Supervisory Board regularly reviews the appropriateness of the compensation of the members of the Management Board, among other things on the basis of a comparison with the Company's internal compensation structure (vertical comparison). For the appropriateness of Management Board compensation within Medios AG, the upper management level below the Management Board within the Medios Group is used as a basis for the Management Board, and the average compensation of the Medios Group's employees in Germany is used as a basis for the workforce as a whole. Both the current ratio and the change in the ratio over time are taken into account by comparing the compensation of the Management Board with the compensation of the respective management level below the Management Board and the total workforce.

#### VI. Sideline activities of Management Board members

The acceptance of public offices, memberships in supervisory boards, boards of directors, advisory boards and comparable mandates, as well as appointments to economic or scientific bodies, requires the prior consent of the Supervisory Board of Medios AG, unless the mandates in question are within the Medios Group.